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Abstract
The hypothesis that inhibitory control – an aspect of executive functioning – is related to
children’s suggestibility was tested. Five- to 7-year-olds (N = 125) participated in a staged event,
were suggestively interviewed, and were later given a recognition test. Conflict and interference
measures of inhibitory control were taken and compared to children’s ability to identify details
from the target event and reject details from non-target sources (i.e., false suggestions, details
from prior events). Children with higher than average verbal retroactive inhibition skills were
more resistant to suggestions than children with poor inhibitory control. Collectively, age and
retroactive inhibition skills accounted for 17% of the variance in suggestibility scores, with each
making independent contributions. Three other measures of inhibition did not, however, correlate
significantly with resistance to suggestion. The findings are discussed in relation to a multicomponent view of eyewitness memory emphasizing links between inhibitory control,
suggestibility, and source monitoring.
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The relation between inhibitory control and children’s eyewitness memory
Research on children’s memory for events that they have witnessed provides a consistent
story about children’s abilities. For example, children’s age and the strength of their memory
traces have repeatedly been shown to relate to children’s accuracy in both non-suggestive and
suggestive paradigms (Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & Kingma, 1990; Bruck & Ceci, 1997;
Goodman, Bottoms, Schwartz-Kenney, & Rudy, 1991; Holliday, Douglas, & Hayes, 1999;
Peterson, 1999; Lamb, Sternberg, & Esplin, 2000). These factors have been used to inform
police and others who interview child witnesses or victims in criminal cases about children’s
competencies. Despite this consensus, there still remain several critical omissions in our
understanding of child eyewitnesses. First, the majority of studies document a high degree of
individual variance in measures of children’s memories, even among children matched for
chronological age. In other words, age only partly explains performance (e.g., Poole & Lindsay,
2001). Second, although forgetting plays an important part, even children who remember their
experiences make significant errors (e.g., Powell & Roberts, 2002). Many contemporary
developmental theories posit that children’s ability to regulate their memories and cognitive
processes and translate them into actions (i.e., their executive functioning) underlies many
aspects of children’s cognitive performance (Harnishfeger, 1995). In the current study, we
examine the usefulness of an executive functioning account of eyewitness memory when
children have been exposed to multiple sources of information, such as, in misinformation or
repeated-event paradigms.
Eyewitness Memory
Children can provide accurate and sometimes detailed accounts of their experiences (e.g.,
Burgwyn-Bailes, Baker-Ward, Gordon, & Ornstein, 2001; Fivush & Shukat, 1995; Peterson &
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Whalen, 2001). Sometimes, however, children are exposed to other events or sources of
information that in some way relate to and can contaminate memories of a target event (for
reviews, see Roberts, 2002; Roberts & Powell, 2001). For example, children may listen to a story
about a similar event (e.g., Poole & Lindsay, 2001), hear inaccurate descriptions of the same or
similar events (e.g., Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Roberts, Lamb, & Sternberg, 1999), watch a
similar event on television (e.g., Roberts & Blades, 1999; Thierry, Spence, & Memon, 2001), be
suggestively interviewed about an event (e.g., Ceci, Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994; Imhoff &
Baker-Ward, 1999; Marche, 1999), experience other similar events (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001;
Powell & Roberts, 2002), or dream about an event. For clarity, we hereafter refer to the original
event as the target event, and related events as non-target events or sources. A typical finding in
the above studies is that suggestibility, or the tendency to change one’s report of the target event
in line with non-target sources such as those listed above, is negatively correlated with age
(Bruck & Ceci, 1997), though reverse trends have been observed (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, &
Forrest, 2002), as well as age invariance in suggestibility (e.g., Howe, 1991). Even when there
are linear age trends, considerable variation often exists within an age group (e.g., Roberts &
Blades, 1999; Quas, Qin, Schaaf, & Goodman, 1997), suggesting that individual differences are
also critical to the accuracy of children’s eyewitness memory.
Although social factors such as the perceived credibility or authority of the interviewer
(e.g., Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987) or a socially-supportive atmosphere (e.g., Carter, Bottoms, &
Levine, 1996) can lead to developmental differences in the accuracy of children’s reports, much
research has investigated the effects of memory-based processes. Constructionist accounts posit
that the non-target information replaces or blends with the original information so that the target
information is no longer available (e.g., Loftus, 1995; Welch-Ross, Diecidue, & Miller, 1997;
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Welch-Ross, 2000). Trace theories claim that the non-target information is more accessible than
the target information, for example, if the non-target information was more recently presented or
was presented multiple times (e.g., Holliday, Douglas, & Hayes, 1999; Marche, 1999; Pezdek &
Roe, 1995). Suggestibility is predicted by the above accounts at times when the false, non-target
information is represented by a stronger memory trace and is thus more likely to be retrieved
than is the original memory trace. For example, Holliday et al. presented 5- and 9-year-olds with
a picture story (either once or thrice) and a misleading narrative about the story (either once or
thrice). Suggestibility was greatest under circumstances when the post-event trace was strong
(i.e., the narrative was presented thrice) and the original trace was weak (i.e., the story was
presented once).
Despite the robust finding that memory is related to children’s suggestibility, in many
studies, children have been able to report information from both target and non-target events
indicating that both sources of information were encoded and retrieved (e.g., Ackil & Zaragoza,
1995; Marche & Howe, 1995; Roberts & Blades, 1999; Powell & Roberts, 2002; Thierry et al.,
2001). For example, in a study on the effects of three prior experiences on memory of a target
event, Powell et al. (1999) found that 75% of the information recalled by 5- to 6-year-olds took
place in one of the four occurrences. However, children were highly confused about which
details took place in the target event and which were from the three prior occurrences. Hence,
some researchers have suggested that children’s errors reflect source confusions, that is, children
mistakenly attribute the source of non-target information to the target event (e.g., Ackil &
Zaragoza, 1995; Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). A source-monitoring account is supported by
evidence that errors are reduced when children are encouraged to pay attention to the origins of
their memories (Lindsay, in press; Poole & Lindsay, 2001; Thierry et al., 2001). The ability to
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accurately monitor sources undergoes significant developments from ages 3 through 8, and this
is also the age at which children are typically most suggestible (see Bruck & Ceci, 1997).
According to the source-monitoring framework, accurately determining the origin of
information requires strategic and reflective abilities (Johnson et al., 1993). Such processes may
require an awareness of the goal of a task, an identification of the best strategies to achieve the
goal, and the regulation of attention so that resources are directed towards processes that
optimally achieve the goal and away from non-optimal processes (Ruffman, Rustin, Garnham, &
Parkin, 2001). Children younger than 3- or 4-years do not appear to have reflective awareness of
where they learned information (Robinson, 2000), but considerable improvements in explicit
reflection of source-monitoring judgments occur between ages 4 and 8 (e.g., Poole & Lindsay,
2001; Roberts & Blades, 1999). Given the executive nature of source-monitoring decisions, we
reasoned that 5- to 7-year-olds’ ability to accurately remember a target event after they have
been exposed to non-target sources should be related to their executive-functioning skills. For the
reasons listed below, we focus specifically in the current investigation on the role of inhibitory
control, an important aspect of executive functioning.
Inhibitory Control
Recall that several studies have demonstrated that children can retrieve both target and
non-target information (e.g., Powell & Roberts, 2002). It seems plausible, then, that accurately
reporting target information involves the inhibition of irrelevant (i.e., non-target) information so
that attention is focused on the target information. This could be achieved by preventing
irrelevant information from entering working memory, by suppressing non-target information
that has already entered working memory, or by restraining dominant response candidates so that
alternatives can be considered (Hasher, Chung, May, & Foong, 2002). Second, one may need to
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inhibit processes, such as familiarity-based reasoning, that typically result in inaccurate
responses (Ruffman et al., 2001). For example, when memory of an event is tested, children can
mistakenly claim information they actually learned from a video occurred in the event simply
because the information seemed familiar. A more strategic analysis of memory of the
remembered material may have led to the identification of the true source, in this case the video,
which would then allow a rejection of the material as originating from the event.
The ability to ignore task-irrelevant information, processes, and automatic or prepotent
responses is considered to be part of an executive skill known as inhibitory control.
Contemporary developmental theories consider inhibition as a central construct (e.g., Brainerd &
Reyna, 1990; Dempster, 1993; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1993; see Harnishfeger, 1995, for a
review) and its role has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts such as theory-of-mind
development (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Nix, 1998; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfie, 1995; Moore, Jarrold,
Russell, Lumb, Sapp, & MacCallum, 1995), free recall (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Howe, 1990),
math skills (Bull & Scerif, 2001), and delay of gratification (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez,
1989).
Developmentally, marked improvements in inhibitory control usually occur between ages
4 and 7 and this is believed to be dependent on frontal lobe development, the area of the brain
that is implicated in executive control (e.g., Dempster, 1993; Passler, Isaac, & Hynd, 1985).
During this period, children show improvements in their ability to attend to stimuli in the face of
salient alternatives, to delay an immediate reward to get a larger reward at a later time, and to
suppress an otherwise automatic response. As discussed above, it is also after this period that
children typically become less susceptible to suggestibility (see Bruck & Ceci, 1997) and are
more able to monitor the sources of their memories at a level closer to that of adults (Roberts,
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2002). Both functionally and ontogenetically, then, inhibitory processes are implicated in
eyewitness memory.
The co-occurrence of frontal lobe, inhibitory control, and source-monitoring
developments does not prove their interactive role in the accuracy of eyewitness memory.
However, there are theoretical links that support this position. For example, a recent
investigation found a positive correlation between source monitoring and inhibitory control
(Ruffman et al., 2001). Six- to 10-year-olds watched a video and listened to an audiotape about a
dog. Inhibitory control, measured with a Stroop-like task where children had to count the number
of digits in an array despite the conflicting number of the digit (e.g., say ‘3’ in response to the
array ‘2 2 2’), was positively related to children’s ability to accurately identify the source of
items that were in the video. Ruffman et al. argued that the task involved the inhibition of
familiarity-based retrieval processes. As noted above, source monitoring requires strategic and
reflective processes (Johnson et al., 1993) and so we investigated whether inhibitory control may
be one of these processes.
Contemporary models of false-memory editing (i.e., the ability to reject postevent
misinformation) focus on automatic memory processes (e.g., the “recollection-rejection model”,
Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) or strategic metacognitive monitoring processes (e.g., the “strategicsuppression model”, Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). However, many researchers acknowledge that
both automatic and intentional processes can contribute to successful false-memory editing, and
may be most successful when both kinds of processes are simultaneously engaged (e.g., Brainerd
& Reyna, 2002; Holliday, Reyna, & Hayes, 2002; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Both
kinds of models provide a theoretical home for the role of inhibitory control in resistance to
suggestion.
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Harnishfeger (1995) distinguished between unintentional and intentional inhibition.
Unintentional inhibition involves the suppression of activated irrelevant items to allow
processing of relevant items and occurs without any conscious awareness; intentional inhibition
occurs when there is a deliberate attempt to suppress stimuli such as in directed-forgetting
paradigms. We extrapolate that unintentional inhibition can also involve suppressing sub-optimal
processing in favour of processing that better suits the demands of the task, without conscious
awareness. Memory-based models that focus on item-level suppression, such as recollectionrejection (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002), allow the possibility that false memories can be edited with
the aid of unintentional inhibition. According to the recollection-rejection model, a false
suggestion (e.g., Coke) that is nevertheless consistent with the gist of the item that was initially
experienced (e.g., 7-Up) can activate the representation of the original item. A verbatim
mismatch occurs because the verbatim details of the original and suggested items differ, for
example, the smell and colour may be different. Hence, the inhibition of gist acceptance
processing allows a verbatim mismatch, thus providing release from reliance on a familiaritydriven judgment that would lead a child to mistakenly accept the gist-consistent Coke as an
original item.
Regarding metacognitive models, inhibitory control can be consciously pursued when
instructed to actively monitor one’s memories on a group-level basis (as in the strategicsuppression model, Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). In general, participants are explicitly instructed
at the beginning of the test to reject suggested information. As outlined by Koriat and Goldsmith,
greater rejection of non-target items occurs because participants are more motivated to do so,
and/or because they are more effectively monitoring their memories (e.g., assessing source,
setting stricter criteria for acceptance, Johnson et al., 1993). It is possible that both automatic and
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strategic processes are involved in both item- and group-level suppression and, as inhibition
comprises several processes that vary in automaticity, the relation that we have proposed
between inhibitory control and suggestibility is feasible for either account of false-memory
editing.
The Current Investigation
Ruffman et al.’s (2001) results suggest that inhibitory control may be important in tasks
that require the sources of memories to be identified. Given that children sometimes remember
both target and non-target information (e.g., Powell & Roberts, 2002), it is plausible that success
on a test of memory for a target event involves inhibiting task-irrelevant information from nontarget sources and/or inefficient processes (e.g., familiarity or gist-acceptance) so that target
information can be accurately identified. We tested whether this assertion is true by examining
the relationship between inhibitory control skills and memory for a target event after exposure to
non-target sources. The non-target sources comprised false suggestions and other experienced
events that were similar to the target event.
We were able to collect numerous individual difference measures from a large sample of
5- to 7-year-old children who had participated in studies on the effects of repeated experience on
children’s suggestibility. Children participated in an event, were suggestively interviewed, and
were later given a memory test about the event (Roberts & Powell, 2003). Immediately after the
memory test, a battery of four inhibitory control tests was administered and it is these novel,
individual differences data that we report in the current study. The inhibitory control scores were
compared to the suggestibility data from the memory test, thus providing a test of the proposed
relationship between inhibitory control and suggestibility.
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We specifically expected that inhibitory control would be negatively correlated with
suggestibility. We hypothesized that the ability to inhibit memories of previously experienced
non-target details and to avoid familiarity-based processing would result in the dominant
activation and processing of target details in working memory, thus leading to increased
acceptance of target information (saying ‘yes’ when the target item was probed) and increased
rejection of non-target information (saying ‘no’ when the non-target or suggested item was
probed). This task implicitly requires source monitoring because children were specifically asked
about the target event after exposure to non-target sources.
Method
Participants
Data were provided by 125 children (61 girls) from five schools in the Melbourne
metropolitan area whose parents had given informed consent. The mean age was 5 years, 9
months (SD = 3.76 months) and ranged from 5 years, 0 months to 7 years, 5 months. Children
had initially been randomly assigned to one of eight Experience (single event, repeated event) x
Suggestive Interview Delay x Memory Interview Delay cells. Specifically, children took part in
the staged event once or four times, were suggestively interviewed three days or three weeks
later, and were given a memory test the day after or three weeks after the suggestive interview.
As the effects of experience and delay are not the focus of the present study, the scores from
children in each cell were standardized to provide sufficient statistical power for an analysis of
individual differences.
Materials
As is customary (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Passler et al., 1985), multiple tests of
inhibitory control were administered. Specifically, we used two conflict tasks (a Stroop-like
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day/night task and a tapping conflict task) and two verbal inhibition tasks (a verbal retroactive
inhibition [RI] task and a verbal proactive inhibition [PI] task). All four tasks are commonly used
in the literature (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001) and were chosen because success occurs at
different times for these tasks over the age range selected in the present study (Passler et al.,
1985). For the day/night task, two cards were created that were identical to the images used by
Gerstadt, Hong, and Diamond (1994). The cards measured 5.4 x 4 inches (approximately 13.5cm
x 10cm). For the tapping task, the child and experimenter each had a pencil that they used to tap
the table. The two interference tasks were exclusively verbal and included two practice trials
using words from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) normed set. The words for the test trials
were taken from the age-normed materials of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of
Intelligence-Revised (Wechsler, 1989), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (Wechsler,
1991), and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981). Two separate
word lists were created and administered to children alternately to control for item effects.
Procedure
The suggestibility procedure.
A trained research assistant (RA) administered the 30-minute activity to groups of 20-28
children aged 5 to 7 (though only children whose parents gave informed consent participated in
the suggestive and memory interviews). Each activity comprised 16 target details embedded in
several activities: physical exercise, listening to a story, doing a puzzle, getting a surprise, and
relaxing.
An unfamiliar RA suggestively interviewed the children about the target event (the only
or final occurrence of the activities), by inaccurately describing half of the event details and
accurately describing the other eight details. For example, the interviewer could inaccurately say
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“I heard there was a puzzle of a clown driving a car with a flat tire. Who put the puzzle together
that day?” (inaccurate details in italics). Questions with inaccurate presuppositions such as these
are known to effectively elicit suggestibility effects (e.g., Roberts et al., 1999) and, indeed, did
so.
The same RA who carried out the previous session later interviewed the children about
the 16 target details in the target event using two sets of yes/no questions; one question in each
set probed the accurate version of the detail, the other probed the inaccurate version (e.g., for the
above example, “Was there a puzzle of a clown juggling, when you wore the badge?” [true
description], and “Was there a puzzle of a clown with a flat tire, when you wore the badge?”
[false description]). This resulted in 32 questions in total (i.e., 16 question pairs, one pair for
each target detail). Whether the accurate or suggested version of each detail was presented first
was counterbalanced, as was the order of presentation of the two sets. Children were given a pretest containing two questions comprising a correct ‘yes’ answer and a correct ‘no’ answer. All
children correctly answered these questions and so no children were excluded. In the main test,
children were to be excluded if they consistently said ‘yes’ to every question or ‘no’ to every
question, though none did and thus none were excluded.1 Children were considered correct if
they accurately answered both ‘no’ to the question about the suggested detail and ‘yes’ to the
question about the target detail, thus, there was therefore a maximum score of 16.
Inhibitory control assessment.
Immediately after the memory interview, the children were given the inhibition tasks. We
followed the procedure for the day/night task reported in Gerstadt et al. (1994). For the first trial,
the child was shown the picture of the sun and asked to say the word “night”. The child was then
instructed to say “night” every time s/he saw the sun card. The picture of the moon was then
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presented and the child was asked to say “day”. The child was then instructed to say “day” every
time s/he saw the moon card. If the child did not say the specified word, the experimenter
prompted the child by saying “What do you say to this card?” without actually mentioning the
word. If the child still did not respond, the interviewer reminded the child of the procedure, and
repeated the practice trials. Once the child was correct on two consecutive trials, the main testing
began. The child was shown the sun and moon cards in random order, one at a time, for a total of
fourteen presentations (seven sun and seven moon presentations). The card was held up for a
second or until the child said “day” or “night”. The only constraint was that no more than two
presentations of the same card could be presented in succession.
The procedure for the tapping task followed that of Luria (1973). The experimenter
tapped the table once with a pencil and instructed the child to tap the table twice. The
experimenter waited while the child did this. The experimenter then tapped the table twice and
informed the child to tap just once, again pausing until the child tapped. The practices continued
until the child was correct on two consecutive trials, at which point the main testing began. For
the next 14 trials, the experimenter tapped the table either once or twice, in random order with
the constraint that the same number was not tapped more than twice in a row. The number of
times that the child tapped the table for each turn was recorded.
A practice session preceded both of the verbal inhibition tests. First, the child listened to
the experimenter say one set of three words (e.g., cat-table-clock) and was asked to repeat the
words. The child then listened to the experimenter say another set of three words (e.g., hatsnake-ladder) and was asked to repeat this second set. The words were spoken at one-second
intervals. For the RI task, the child was then asked to repeat the first set of words again (i.e., cattable-clock) to see whether words from the second set interfered with recall of words from the
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first set; for the PI task, the child was required to repeat the second set (i.e., hat-snake-ladder) to
see whether words from the first set interfered with recall of the second. The child was given
four such practice trials and if the child accurately repeated at least one of the three words from
the specified set on two consecutive trials, main testing began. Main testing comprised five trials
and the number of words the child repeated from the target sets (maximum of 15 for each test)
was recorded.
To prevent perseverance effects on the verbal inhibition tasks, these tasks were alternated
with the conflict tasks. Eight orders were created (e.g., day/night, PI, tapping, RI; PI, tapping, RI,
day/night, etc.). As each child was tested, the experimenter rotated through these orders to
prevent order effects contaminating the results.
Coding
Children’s responses to the 16 pairs of yes/no questions were scored as correct if they
answered ‘yes’ to the accurate description of the item and ‘no’ to the inaccurate description.
Hence, these scores (out of 16) effectively show resistance to suggestion and will hereafter be
referred to as the “resistance scores”. A high score reflects low suggestibility. Standardized
resistance scores were used in all subsequent analyses.
Responses to the four inhibitory control tests were coded as correct or incorrect (as
outlined above). Thus, there was a maximum correct score of 14 for the day/night and tapping
tests; 15, for the RI and PI tests. High scores reflect high levels of inhibitory control.
Results
Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive data for the four inhibition tests are displayed in Table 1. While scores on the
day/night, tapping, and PI task were above the median scale value, almost half of the sample
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(43%) failed the RI pre-test. Only children who passed the pre-tests were included in the
following analyses. Bivariate correlations were computed between the four inhibitory control
tests and age (in months). Scores on the RI test were positively correlated with scores on all three
other tests (RI and day/night: r = .23, p = .05; RI and tapping: r = .24, p < .05; RI and PI: r = .43,
p < .001). Age was positively related to PI scores only (r = .24, p < .02).
We predicted that inhibitory control would be positively related to the resistance scores.
There was a positive correlation between the RI scores and standardized resistance scores (r =
.34, p < .01), and the correlation remained when age was controlled (r = .31, p < .01). None of
the other inhibition scores correlated significantly with the resistance scores (rs = .05, .12, -.01,
for the day/night, tapping, and PI scores, respectively).
Inferential Analyses
To further explore the relation between the RI and resistance scores, children were
classified as high or low inhibitors. The score corresponding to the 50th percentile of the RI test
was used as the cutoff, thus, children scoring below the 50th percentile score were classified as
“low inhibitors” (N = 38, M = 0.71, SD = .80), and those scoring at or above the 50th percentile
score were classified as “high inhibitors” (N = 33, M = 5.52, SD = 2.12).
It was predicted that children with low inhibition scores would be less resistant to
suggestions than children with high inhibition scores. The resistance scores were entered into a 2
(RI group: low, high) t-test. As expected, High inhibitors (Raw scores: M = 11.58 out of 16, SD
= 3.10; Standardized scores: M = 0.39, SD = 0.82) were less suggestible than Low inhibitors (M
= 9.45, SD = 3.86; ; Mz = -0.26, SDz = 1.14), t(69) = -2.74, p < .01 (see Figure 1). A 2 (RI group:
low, high) analysis of covariance was carried out on the resistance scores, and showed that the
main effect described above remained when age was controlled, F(1, 68) = 5.42, p = .02.
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To cross-validate these results, we classified the children who provided RI scores as
suggestible or not, to test the hypothesis that suggestible children have less well developed
inhibitory control skills than children who can resist suggestions. A 50th percentile split on the
standardized resistance scores was used to create a “high resistance” group (N = 36, M = 0.85,
SD = 0.36) and a “low resistance” group (N = 35, M = -0.79, SD = 0.85). We then compared the
RI scores of children in the low and high resistance groups using an independent samples t-test.
As predicted, children in the high-resistance group had higher RI scores (M = 3.83 out of 15, SD
= 3.07) than those in the low-resistance group (M = 2.03, SD = 2.34), t(69) = -2.78, p < .01 (see
Figure 2). The main effect of group was also found when the RI scores were analyzed with a 2
(Resistance group: low, high) ANCOVA controlling for age in months, F(1, 68) = 6.37, p = .01.
Finally, regression analyses were carried out to estimate the relative contribution of
inhibitory control and age to resistance to suggestibility. Two models were tested. Model 1
regressed inhibitory control (i.e., RI) onto the resistance scores, and Model 2 regressed age in
months and RI score onto the resistance scores. Both models were significantly different from
zero: Model 1, R = .34, F(1, 70) = 9.05, p < .01; Model 2, R = .41, F(2, 70) = 6.96, p < .01.
Model 1, with RI as the only predictor, accounted for 12% of the variance in resistance scores;
Model 2, with age in months and RI as the predictors, accounted for 17%, F change (1, 68) =
4.42, p < .05. The standardized coefficients from Model 2 showed that RI made a greater
contribution ( = .30, t = 2.71, p < .01) than did age ( = .24, t = 2.10, p < .04). Children with
low RI scores were more suggestible than those with high RI scores, consistent with the results
reported above, and younger children were more suggestible than older children. Thus, the
regression analyses showed that age and RI collectively predicted a modest amount of the
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variance in the resistance scores, and RI made an independent contribution above and beyond
age.2
Discussion
This research was undertaken to understand the processes connected with children’s
difficulty in providing information about a specific, target event after exposure to false
suggestions and related events. Although research has shown that memory undoubtedly plays a
large part, there are times when children fail to identify the target information even when
memory for target and non-target information is intact. One possibility in these cases is that
children’s errors stem from source-monitoring deficiencies whereby memories from a non-target
source intrude into reports of the target source. Source monitoring requires strategic and
reflective processing according to the source-monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), yet it
is not clear what these processes might be with regards to children’s performance. In the current
study, we investigated whether executive functioning – specifically, inhibitory control – was
related to children’s ability to discriminate between target and non-target event information in an
eyewitness paradigm. We reasoned that children who could inhibit task-irrelevant information
(in this case, memories of non-target events) and processes (e.g., familiarity-based reasoning)
and thus focus more on task-relevant information (i.e., memories of the target event) would be
better able to identify target event information and reject non-target information in a recognition
test. We found clear and consistent evidence that inhibitory control, as measured by the verbal
retroactive inhibition task, was positively related to resistance to suggestibility: Children with
greater than average levels of inhibitory control were less suggestible than children with low
inhibitory control. Further, although age expectedly also contributed to children’s suggestibility
with younger children being more suggestible than older children, retroactive inhibition skills
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made a substantial, unique contribution to the variance in the suggestibility scores (i.e.,
independently accounting for 12%).
Although retroactive inhibition was strongly and consistently related to suggestibility, the
relation between inhibition and suggestibility was not observed when inhibition was measured by
the two conflict tasks (day/night, tapping) and the proactive inhibition task. Table 1 shows that
scores on these three tasks were above average and quite high. Hence, it could be that ceiling
effects on these measures reduced the chances of finding a significant relationship.3 Performance
on inhibitory control tasks in general shows dramatic development between the ages of 6 and 8,
with peak performance on many tasks (such as the nonverbal conflict and verbal proactive
inhibition tasks used in the current study) evident around age 8. Adult levels of verbal retroactive
inhibition are not achieved, however, until about age 12 (Passler et al., 1985). Thus,
suggestibility may have been more sensitive to variations in verbal retroactive interference than
other measures of inhibitory control in this sample of 5- to 7-year-olds. That is, the children in
our sample (whose average age was almost 6 years) could control their responses in the conflict
and verbal proactive interference tasks, but showed great individual variation in their ability to
resist interference retroactively, in line with Passler et al.’s (1985) findings. An obvious
extension of this work, then, is to replicate the study with a younger sample of children who
might show greater variance in inhibition and who are undergoing significant developments in
executive control and other skills that are localized in the frontal lobe, such as source monitoring
(Dempster, 1993).
The finding that inhibitory control (as measured by the retroactive inhibition test) was
related to accuracy after exposure to misinformation and highly similar experiences does not
oppose other theoretical explanations of eyewitness accuracy (e.g., trace theory, Marche, 1999;
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understanding of conflicting mental representations, Welch-Ross et al., 1997). Rather, it is
possible that inhibitory control is one of a set of processes necessary to accurately report target
information. Recent discussions on eyewitness memory and suggestibility highlight its complex
and multi-component nature and stress the importance of individual differences (e.g., Imhoff &
Baker-Ward, 1999; Quas et al., 1997; Poole & Lindsay, 2001; Roebers & Schneider, 2001).
Poole and Lindsay, for example, found that age, acquiescence, recall, and source monitoring all
contributed independently to children’s suggestibility.
As noted earlier, Ruffman et al. (2001) found that inhibitory control was related to source
monitoring. As we used an implicit test of source monitoring (i.e., to recognize target and reject
non-target information requires source monitoring), a logical extension of this and Ruffman et
al.’s research is to examine the relation between inhibition and a direct measure of source
monitoring in a suggestibility or repeated events paradigm. Theoretically, it would be especially
interesting to examine relations between these skills and working memory, language, and an
understanding of conflicting mental representations in situations requiring source discrimination
given the reported co-variation of these skills (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Carlson &
Moses, 2001; Ruffman et al., 2001; Welch-Ross et al., 1997). Such investigations may illuminate
what kinds of processes are needed to accurately report information from a specific, target event.
The relationship may also contribute to an understanding of memory of traumatic events
considering that some victims of crimes are motivated to actively inhibit painful memories (see
Anderson & Green, 2001).
Although the hypothesized relationship between retroactive inhibitory control and
suggestibility was observed, these novel results demand replication. Theoretically, the finding
that inhibitory control uniquely contributed to suggestibility above and beyond age, generates

The relation between inhibitory control

21

many interesting and testable hypotheses. The relation between inhibition and suggestibility in
an eyewitness situation should be most important when the non-target source is more prepotent
or dominant than the target source (e.g., when probed in a recognition test, at long delays, when
the target details have been forgotten, when the suggestions are highly plausible) or when source
confusions are highly likely (e.g., when there is no explicit demand to monitor source, when
sources are highly similar, etc.). Inhibitory control, in contrast, should not relate to accurately
reporting memories of details that were never inaccurately described because there would be less
need to inhibit memories of non-target details, and target details can be identified on the basis of
familiarity alone (cf. Ruffman et al.’s [2001] finding that inhibitory control was not related to
correct recognition). Further, how might inhibitory control interact with social processes
involved in suggestibility? It may be that suggestions from a plausible or knowledgeable
interviewer are harder to inhibit than suggestions from less credible sources. In the current study,
the person who suggestively interviewed the children also carried out the subsequent memory
interview (i.e., was knowledgeable). Children who possess a “theory of mind” (as the 5- to 7year-old children in the current would have done) are more suggestible when interviewed by a
knowledgeable interviewer than an ignorant interviewer (Welch-Ross, 1999). Thus, children
with a theory of mind but who lack strong inhibitory skills may be more at risk than children
without strong inhibitory skills to succumbing to the suggestions from knowledgeable
interviewers. Further research can identify the exact relationships between these variables and
clarify how cognitive and social mechanisms interact to produce suggestibility effects.
In sum, the main contribution of the reported results is that they a) provide an empirical
demonstration of the relationship between individual differences in an aspect of executive
functioning and eyewitness memory, a finding that motivates subsequent investigations to more
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fully understand the nature of the relationship, and b) suggest how different cognitive processes
and age may interact in complex ways. Further research is clearly needed, however, to fully
understand the nature of the relationship beyond this exploratory work. The power of the
findings is that they indicate one process that may be involved when children remember both
target and non-target (e.g., suggested) information. The findings add to a multi-component,
developmental view of the suggestibility process and indicate that, in future, it may be beneficial
to focus on the relations between emerging cognitive skills localized in the frontal lobes (e.g.,
inhibitory control, source monitoring, working memory) that may be involved when children are
required to report information from a target event. Increased understanding of the complexity of
suggestibility mechanisms promotes a more sensitive assessment of child witness competencies,
perhaps leading to the identification of predictors other than age.
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Footnotes
1

Children did, however, err more often by saying ‘yes’ to both questions (29% of responses) than

by saying ‘no’ to both questions (4% of responses).

2

A regression analysis was carried out to see whether a model with age and all four measures of

inhibitory control accounted for any more of the variance than did the model with just RI and
age. The model with all five predictors was just significant, R = .41, F(5, 63) = 2.38, p = .05, but
accounted for no more of the variance than did the model with just RI and age as predictors (i.e.,
both models accounted for 17% of the variance). Additionally, in the five-predictor model, Beta
values were above .10 only for RI ( = .25, t = 1.76, p = .08, 2-tailed) and age ( = .29, t = 2.31,
p < .05). Thus the model with RI scores and age provided the best fit for the data.

3

Also, although all scores were significantly correlated with the RI score, the correlations were

in the weak to modest range (i.e., rs between .20 and .40). This again points to a ceiling effect,
especially on the conflict tasks that showed the weakest correlations with RI score. Perhaps the
conflict and PI tasks did not produce enough range in scores to find stronger relationships
between the variables.
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Table 1
Descriptive data for the inhibition tests.

Statistic

Day/Night Test

Tapping Test

Proactive

Retroactive

(out of 14)

(out of 14)

Inhibition Test

Inhibition Test

(out of 15)

(out of 15)

Minimum score

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Maximum score

14.00

14.00

15.00

12.00

Mean score

10.84

12.12

9.80

2.94

Standard Deviation

3.53

2.99

4.65

2.87

N passed pre-test

125

124

104

71

N failed pre-test

0

1

21

74
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Table 2
Bivariate correlations between the inhibitory control tests, age, and resistance to suggestibility.
Test

Tapping

Day/Night

Tapping

Proactive

Retroactive

Age

Inhibition

Inhibition

(in months)

-.035
N = 124

Proactive Inhibition

Retroactive Inhibition

Age (in months)

Standardized
Resistance Scores

.033

.089

N = 104

N = 103

.232*

.244*

.429***

N = 71

N = 71

N = 64

-.005

.003

.235**

.159

N = 125

N = 124

N = 104

N = 71

.054

.116

-.010

.340***

.117

N = 125

N = 124

N = 104

N = 71

N = 125

Notes.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.02 level (2-tailed).
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Figure Captions

Figure 1
Resistance to suggestibility as a function of inhibitory control level.

Figure 2
Inhibitory control scores as a function of resistance to suggestibility.
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